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~fiiis paper considers a ~corld of man}' s}'n~tmetric countries ~~~hcre public goods in
hriuciple are [inanc~~cl bc taxes on sa~iog. in~'estment and pnreprofits. In thcon.
countries could use all three taxes in combination. In praetice. ho~~~e~~er. the taz
instrnment ;a~t ~na~' be rearicted b~-. for instance, tax e~'asion of a particular kind
or sume inti~rnational agreement. This paper compares ~cel[are le~~Pls if countrie, set
taxes nuncool~erati~~~l~- across different ta~ instntment sets. 41~e lind that deprnding
on tbF~ sh~~~u~th of prr~ferences for public good,. tax evasion tftat renders either
~a~~in; or in~~ostmeut tazes infeasible mav be ~~elfare improving, if firm~ are in part
for~~i~n-o~cnecl.1 Introduction
This paper considers the implications for welfare of changes in the availability of
capital income tax instruments in a world economy with cross-ownership of firms.
In the open economy, capital income taxation can generally be levied according
to either the residence principle or the source principle, or both.t Capital income
taxation according to the residence principle implies the taxation of savings, whereas
if the source principle is applied, this is tantamount to taxation of investment. Of
course, this cíistinction is immaterial for a closed economy, but it is crucial in the open
economy. where a saving tax and an investrnent tax are verv different instruments.
Hence, u-hether an opcn economy has access to only one of these tax instruments in
lien of both should in general irnpinge on welfare in that country.
Che issue of a~ailability of capital income tax instrurnents is an important one,
~or~- rele~ant for tax polic~~ in today's worlcí economy. Capital has beconre increas-
iogly rnobile. due to changes in policy and to decreasing transactions costs associated
~cith financial placements abroad by firrns ancí indi~.iduals. Since at the sarne tirne
t.here are ~ irtuallc no international agreE~rnents as to the exchange of tax information
bet~ceen countries, it has become easy for individuals in many countries to conca~al
the mtmn on their foreign securities and cíepostits from domestic authorities. "I'here-
b~, domestic sa~ers can escape saeing taxation by simply relocating Cuuds abrond.
.-1s a result. residence-based capital income taxation is under threat and ma~. ocer
time be rendered completely ine(fective. Instead of having access to both sourcc-
and residence-based capital income taxes, countries would tben in effect onl~~ ha~~e
source-based taxes left. ~~"ould this development itnply a decrease in welfare on the
part of countries in the world economy'.
~I~o answer this question, it appears important to introduce a few realist.ic features
of the international econorny as of today. Pirst, despite several attempts there is verc
little coordination of capital income tax policies in the world economy. `ot ecen in
the EC has it become possible, to achieve any tneasurable degree of coordination
bettceen member states.1 In setting their capital income tax policy, countries basi-
cally ~corry about domestic effects of dornestic taxes (rather than their international
effects). whilc taking the tax policies of other countries as given. 3[oreo~-er. therc
is as said close to no exchange of information between tax authorities in different
countries on capital income accruing to foreigners. In consequence. capital income
tax policies in the international economv are best characteriLed as non-cooperatire.
5econd, two additional characteristics of the world economv seem crucial.
~iowhere in the world does one find full taxation of pure profits or rents (return
to fixed factors). On the contrary, rates of tax on pure profits seem to be con-
tAtcording to the residence principle, tapital income is taxed where it is received, whereas
following the source principle, it is taxed where it originates.
zFor instance, the main recommendations in the Ruding Report (1992) have never been tarried
ou[.
1strained to effective levels well below one hundred percent. These limitations on
profit tasation may have to do with an inability to distinguish pure profits from the
ordinary return to capital, or with a fear that in the end, pure profits result from
entrepreneurial efTort which may not be in entirely inflexible supply. Further, in in-
dustrialized countries there is a significant degree of foreign ownership of domestic
firms and, vice versa, domestic ownership of foreign firms. The reasons for this cross-
ou~nership can be many, but the unimpeded mobility of capital across countries has
been instrumental in establishing the cross-ownership pattern.
~Vhen firms with a partly international ownership generate pure profits, income
fíows between countries will feature not onl}' ordinary return to capital, but also
cross-country profit fiows. Since countries via their capital income (and profit) taxes
are able to affect the size of outgoing aíter-tax profit flows, non-cooperative capital
income taxation will generate international externalities, entailing ine[bciencies in
tax policy as seert from the world as a whole. Given this insight, would it really be
detritnental for indi~~idual countries if the}' w'ere to lose the sa~~ing tax instrument.
i.e. if they moved from non-cooperative tax polic} with both source and residence
taxes to non-cooperati~~e tax policy ~eith only source taxes available?
[n principle. the effective loss of one oF the two capital income tax instrurnents can
also be brought about if the world's countries w~ere to agree on exclusive application
of the residenre pt'itltiple or the source principle in capital incorne taxation. For
conrpleteness. we therefore also wish to investigate what would happen if the world~s
countries w.ere to move frorn a situation with both saving and investntent taxes
acailable to a situation in which they effectively have access to just residence-based
taxes on saving.
'Ihe main result of the paper is that tmder certain conditions the loss o( residence-
based taxation of saving will be beneficial for countries in the world economy. Apart
from incornplete profit taxation and cross-ownership of firms, the requirement for
this to hold is that preferences for public goods are not too strong. The intuition
for the result is as follows: The presence of cross-country profit flows leads to a
desire on the part of governtnents to snatch part of the profits accruing to foreign
owners of domestic firms. With lirnited profit taxes this is accomplished bc means of
source-based investment taxes, resulting in overtaxation oE capital income relative
to taxation under coordination. [f saving taxes are eliminated, then capital incorne
will as a whole be less heavily taxed, }~íelding a better approximation to taxation
under coordination. This reasoning applies when preferences for public goods are
not too strong; otherwise, the negative international externality associated w-ith the
beggar-thy-neighbor tax w~ill be offset by a more subtle positive externality operating
through the income effect of international taxation on national saving.3
Given the possibility of a positive welfare effect of losing residence-based capital
income taxation, it may not make a lot of sense for the world's countries to spend vast
resources to combat evasion of saving taxation (unless perhaps internal redistibution
is the preeminent goal of tax policy).
3Details on this latter externality are provided later on.
~In a similar way w'c also demonstrate in the paper that if countries in the world
were to agree on exclusive use of residence-based capital income taxation (while
abolishing source-based taxes), then such an international agreement could actually
be welCare-improving.4
Despite the importance and policy relevance of the problem, the literature on
capital income taxation in open economies has until now not focused on the welfare
implications of restrictions on the set of feasible capital income tax instruments in
a setting with cross-owncrship of firms. All the same, it is helpful to review key
contributions to the literature. Several authors have examined the optimal capital
income taxation in a small open economy. An important result in Gordon (1986),
Frenkel et al. ( L991) and others is that a small economy optimally does not levy
a source-based investment tax if the tax instrument set is not restricted. ~~~'ith a
restricted profit tax, however, source-based investment taxes are generally optimally
applied. Iluizinga and vielsen (199ï) examine in detail how the desired mix of saving
and investment and profit taxes in this setting depends on the feasibilit}~ of profit
taxation and on the extent of Coreign ownership of domestic firms. Foreign ow~nership
renders im'estrnent and profit taxation more attractive relative to saving taxation.
and thc optimal sign of saving taxation may even be negative.
;1 relati~el~- small literature exarnines whether there is a need to coordinate
capital income f axes internationally. Razin and Sadka (1991) consider a model where
labor and capital are inputs into a production Cunction with constant returns to
scale. Thec show- that t~co countries have no reason to coordinate either saving or
invesment taxes iC thec take the world interest rate as given. Bucovetsky and ~~'ilson
(1991) consider labor. saving and in~~estment taxes in a similar model. but they let
the world interest rate be endogenous. They find, anrong other things, that countries
hace no neecí to coordinate co-existing saving and investment taxes, w~hile Krelove
(1992) finds that the coordination of investment taxes alone may entail either a
lower or a higher investment tax.
Following the discussion of international capital income tax coordination (cfr.
OECD (1991), the Ruding Report (1992). and Serensen (1993)), we in Huizinga
and lielsen (1996) extend our small open economy model to examine the scope for
tax coordination in a model of many symmetric small countries. ~Ve show that when
profits are fully taxed or there is no foreign ow'nership, noncooperative joint saving
and in~~estment taxes are in fact optimal. In other instances, there generally is a
need to coordinate capital income taxes, as one country's tax policy has first order
implications for any other country's pricate welfare or tax revenues.
í3uilding on the above work, this paper focuses on a symmetric multi-country
world with cross-ownership of firms and examines how welfare in each country de-
pends on the feasible tax instrument set. The analysis presupposes that countries do
QAn international agreement of this kind would probably need to be backed up by a commitment
technology, since otherwise it would be in any single country's interest to reintroduce the source-
based tax. Also, the argument presupposes that an international agreement on the tax instument
set may be feasible where an agreement on the rates of taxation is not.
3not coordinate their tax policies. To be precise, we compare the welfare of each indi-
~'idual country' in the `ash tax-setting equilibria across various models that differ in
the set of available tax instrurnents. 'I'he tax instrument set in principle consists of a
(limited) profit tax, a sa~~ing tax and an in~estrnertt tax. .A restricted tax instrument
set is taken to be an instrument set that does not include either a saving tax or an
in~'estment tax. "I'he paper specifically focuses on comparing a setting in which both
saving and in~'estment taxation are feasible with settings where only one of these is
feasible.
11'e organize the paper as folloivs. Section 2 considers the mix of sa~.ing, invest-
rnent and profit taxation that is optimal from the perspective of a single country~
that can lev}~ a limited profit tax. It also considers optimal tax policy in the small
open economy'. if either the saving tax or the investment tax is unavailable. Section :3
instead examines optimal tax policy for a closed econonrv that itnposes a single tax
wedge between the gross return to investment and the uet return to saving. 5ections
l and :3 are prerequisites for the welfare comparison of ~arious tax regimes in section
}. For a gi~'en (limited) (easibility' of profit taxation and a given cross-ownership of
firms. ~~'e consider two ~celfare comparisons: i) joint saving and investment taxation
against oulc in~cstment taxation, and ii) joint sa~~ing and im~estment taxation a-
;aiust onl~ sa~iug tasation. :1s special cases, we also briefly~ consider that profits
are fully tazed, or there is no cross-owernship of firms. Section 5 concludes.
2 Tax policy in the small open economy
'I'his section cxamines tl~e optimal capital incoene tax policy frotn the perspecti~e
of a small open econo[ny~. The analysis in this section corresponds to Huizinga a,nd
`ielsen (Ip97) with the exception that in this paper we do not consider thc possibility
of government lump surn income transfers to domestic citizens, and that public
qoods supply. is endogenously rather than exogenously determined. "The section first
outlines the basic modeL It then considers optimal tax policy in turn for the cascs
where (a) saving. in~'estment and profit taxes are all available, (b) only~ investment
and protit taxes are acailable, and (c) only sa~~ing and profit taxes are a~~ailable.
2.1 The basic model
:1 small open economp is one of many syrnrnetric small open economies in the world
economy. The economy~, which exists for rieo periods. takes the world interest rate,
r, as given. Each country's representative agent receives an endowmenL Y. of a
single good in the first period. This endowment is allocated between first period
consutnption, Ct, and saving, S. [n the first period, firms make investments, I~,
which are only~ productive in the second period. In the second period households
spend their net-of-tax return from saving and profit income to consume C2.
4Consumers also enjoy a public good, G, provided b~. the government in the second
period. To finance this public good, the government can impose a sacing tax at the
rate u, and an investment tax at the rate u, both payable in the second period. In
addition. second period firm profits are taxed at a rate r. Profits are positive because
there is some factor of production, e.g. land or entrepreneurial services, in inelastic
supply or, alternaticely, there are decreasing returns to scale in capital investments.
I'he investrnent tax bill, al~, is deductible from taxable profits. The profit tax rate,
~. cannot exceed a maximum of ~ C I. There are no other restrictions on the sizes
or signs of the three taxes. u, i~, and ;. Finally, ~~-e assume that a firm and thus its
profit stream are in part foreign-o~cned. In particular. let us assume that a share
n~ 0 of each country.'s firtns is owned by forcigners. Concersely, domestic citirens
oK-n a total share of ct' o[ (oreign firms.
['irms produce an output F(L~ ) in the second period, where the production
function h' is assumed to be strictly concare. Firrns~ after-tax profits are equal to
(I - z)[F(lí) - (L f r f ~~)1~]. where 1 f r f t~ is the user cost of capitaL ~I~hc~
maximization of profits on the part of firrns yiclds the following optimal in~estment
rttlc.
F'(Ií)- 1~- r-}- t~ (2.1)
Iluuschold, face the follotving t~eo-period budget constraint,
Cz-Í}~-Ct)~Ifr-u)f~l--)~t-a)[F(Iij-(ltrfc)lí]
~~1- ~-)a-[r~r~-)- (1 ~ r ~- ~.-)r,'1 (~'.~~)
~chere stars denote foreign ~.ariables.'
Consumers deri~~e utilit~- from consurnption in both periods and from the public
good. C. Lifetinte utilit}~ is assumed to be additivel~- separable, and is ~critten as
(.~(Ct. Cz)f 6`(G). The first order condition regarding the private consumption choice
is as follows.
~t - ~'2~1 t r- u) ('?.3)
The budget constraint of the go~-ernment stipulates that overall tax recenues
eyual the provision of the public good, G, as follows,
OGG'-nSfvlí-{-z(F(I~)-(l~r~c)lí~ (2..1)
I'ax policy is set so as to maximize the utility o( thc representati~.e agent. Por-
mallc, the governrnent, faces the problern of choosing the tax rates z, u and r so as
to maximize the follo~cing Lagrangean expression,
~ -~"(~t,(Y -ct)(1 fr-al)f (1 -~)~1 -a)[F~~~~-(1 t r-~ t,)r.]t
5`ote that profits earned abroad qua domestic ownership of foreign firms are not taxed at home,
so deductibility or creditabilí[} oC(oreign profit taxes is irrelevant. In effect, the profit tax is solely
source-based. Further, the profit tax does not discriminate between (oreign and domestic owners
o( domes[ic hrms. T'hese assumptions could be altered without significantly affecting qualitative
results.
5(1 - z')a'[F(h')-(1 f r~- v')li']) ~- V(G)
f~(uS ~- v!í t z[F(Ií)-(I -~ r~- v)lí ]- G) f p(i - z) (2.5)
where ,~ and p are Lagrange multipliers associated with the government budget
constraint ('?.4) and the upper bound on the profit tax, z. The first order conditions
regarding the tax rates ~, u and v and the volume of public goods, G, associated
with (2.5) can be stated as follows,
[a(1 f (1 - a)up) - uz(i - a)1[F(x) - (1 ~ r f v)~t] - ~ - o (z.s)
-U2 -}. a(1 - ue„) - 0 (2.ï)
-i-z(f - ~)(1- a) ~- a((1 - ~)(i t (1 - a)un) - evv] - o (z.s)
v~(G) - a - o (~.9)
where e~, --(dlí~dr)~I~ is the semi-elasticity of investment with respect to the
in~estment tax r. e„ - -(dS~du)~S is the uncompensated semi-elasticitr of saving
with respect to the sa~-ing tax u, and p denotes the propensity to consume in the
first. period out of serond period income. [t can be seen that eu - e„ f p ~ 0 is
the compensated semi-elasticity of saving with respect to the saving tax, u. The
nncompensated semi-elasticity e„ will also be taken to be positive in what follows.
Tbe Gc~t arder eonditions (2.6)-(2.9) form thc hasis nf the descripGi4n of optimal
tax policy~ in the cases where all three tax instruments are available, or where either
thc saving tax or the im'estment tax are not part of the instrument set. E3elow, we
briefl~~ characterize the optimal tax policy in the three cases in three subsections.s
Tlnoughout this section, we maintain the assumptions of a~ 0 and i G 1. i.c. that
there is some cross-ownership of firms and that profits can only be taxed incomplete-
ly, which ensures that there is a positive profit fiow from domestic firms to foreign
residents. :-1t the end of section 4, we briefly. discuss the cases where either a- 0 or
~ - 1.
2.2 All tax instrutnents available
From conditions (`l.6)-(2.9), the optimal saving tax, u, can be seen to be eithcr
positi~~e or negative, while the im.estment tax, v, is always non-negative. The exact
sizes of the capital income taxes depend on the desired level of public goods and
on the maximum profit tax rate, z. Five separate cases in increasing public goods
demand can be distinguished as follows:
In case i), the maximum profit tax rate, i, is not binding and the marginal cost
of public funds, r~ - a~U2, is less than one at r~ - (1-a)eu~(eu-ap). The saving tax
is negative at u--a~((1 - a)eu], while the investment tax v is zero. The negative
saving tax enables the tax authorities to redistribute foreign profit income, as taxed
6A more detailed distussion can be found in Iluizinga and Nielsen (1996).
6via the proftt tax, to dornestic residents.' In the borderline case ii), the profit tax
constraint z is just binding so that we have u G 0 and e- 0 as in case i) w-ith
the marginal cost of funds (~ICPF) also as in case i). In the intermediate case iii),
preferences for public goods are so strong that the investrnent tax contributes as a
substitute profit tax to finance the public goods provision and the saving subs-idv,
tvhile the ~IC'PF remains below unity. 1ext, in case iv) the saving tax rate, u, is
just equal to zero. and the cost of funds, rl, equals unity, while the inv.estment tax
rate is at the national income maximizing value of a- a(1 - i)~e,,. Finally, in case
v) both sacing and investment taxes are positive with the i`'ICPF exceeding one.
The various possible combinations of optimal tax rates with all three instruments
available are illustrated in Figure 1. panel ( a). Thc tax rates are there depicted as
fituctions oC the marginal cost of public funds which functions as an indicator of the
strcngth of preferences Cor public goods.
2.3 Only investment and profit taxation
absent the sacing tax. optimal tax policy is Cound from equations ('2.6). (2.i)) aud
(2.9). ccith u set cyual to zero in (2.6) and (2.8).
Some inspection receals that three cases r.an he rlistingnished. Fnr relativel~' r~eak
preferences for public goods. onl}. the profit tax, z, will be used (at a rate belotc the
maximum rate :) in the noncooperative equilibrium with t~ - 0. The rnarginal cost
of public funds theu is p-(I - a). [n the second case. the profit tax constraint is
just binding. while r and q are still equal to 0 and 1- a, respectivelc. ~~~ith eren
stronger preferences for public goods, the country sets the profit tax at its maximum
~ and the in~~estment tax. u, abov~e zero, resulting in a ~ICPF exceeding 1- a. [n
t}iis third case, the investment tax, r, can be v,-ritten in terms of t.he ~[C'PF as
c' - (1 - ~)~1 - l1 - a)~O~~e~-
Figure l. panel (b) depicts hotc the profit and investment tax rates ~ and c~ are
related to the strength of prefcrences for public goods as proxied b}~ q.
2.4 Only saving and profit taxation
~4'ithout an investmettt tax (perhaps due to some international agreement), the first
order conditions (2.6). (2.7) and (2.9) with t~ - 0 characterize the optimal sa~-ing
and profit tax rates and the optimal provision of public goods.
:lgain. three cases in increasing preferences for public goods provision can be
distinguished. The first case has an underused profit tax, i.e. z G z, a negative
'To be exact, Che existence of this and the subsequent case requires i 7 oh'~(e~(1 -Q)(F(h') -
( I} rll~)~. i.c. a relatively high maximum profit tax rate, high saving elasticity, and low foreign
ownership share. This condition is taken to hold without any implication For our conclusions.
7saving tax at u--n~[(1 - n)eu] G 0. and a marginal cost of public funds at
q-(1 - n)e;,~(eu - np]. In this instance, the pressure to finance public goods is so
low that some pro(it tax revenues are used to finance a negative saving tax so as
to redistribute income to ciomestic residents. ~1 borderline case then follows where
the profit tax constraint is just. binding and ~chere the values of the saving tax rate
ancí thc `(CPF as in the previous case. `~'ith even stronger preference for public
goods, the profit tax rate conatraint is stricll~- binding, and the saving tax increases
e~~entually to a positi~e levcl. -Che ~[CP1~ similarly rises from thc vahte given abo~~c.
~otc that rvith a saving tax equal to zero. the ~ICPF just equals unit~~.
Thc possible configurations oE profit anci sa~.ing tax rates in the ahsence of thc
investmenl. tax are illustrated in Figurc 1. panel (c).
3 Tax policy in the closed economy
fn this scction. ~~'e consirler the optimal capital iucome and profit tax polic~ in a
closcd cconom~'. 1'he closed economy is taken to be identical to the single small
upen econom~ considered in the precious section. Obviously. the closed econotn~ ~s
~a~in,~ and in~~estment have to be equal, i.a ti- Ií. The closed econom}'~s tax
polic~ curresportds to the coordinated tax policy- in a world oE man}~ identical small
opeu econornies. This sectiun lh~c~Eore sets the stage for the later ~celfarr cvalnation
uf dilferent noncooperati~r tax regimes in section ~1.8
ln the closecl econotm'. thc tas authorit~- has a single tax instnuncnt. .r. to
introduce a rccrlge betaeen the gross return to investment and the nct return to
~a~ing. I'hr tax c can be thought t.o be levied on saving so that the nct return to
sa~.ing i, r- a~. ~~'hilt: r is the return to im'estment and the market ratc of interest.
`s before. the tax authority can tax profits at a rate z C ~.
Profit maximiration on thc part of firms nov,. ~.ields the following in~'estmeut
nrle.
('r(K) - 1 t r (3.1)
Ilic budget constraints for private agents and thc gocernntent are gi~'en b}-,
C~-(r"-Ct)(lTr-r)f(1-s)[F(lí)-(ltr)lí] (3.2)
0 G G- rti ~ z[F(lí)- (l f r)lí] (3.3)
lgain, the gov-ernment r.hooses tax polic~-, i.e. the tax rates .r and z. so as to
maximize the utilit}~ oC the representati~.e agent. The optimalit}~ conditions with
"I;y fucusing on symmetric countries we concentrate on average externalities between countries
in non-cooperative tax policy eyuilibria. The implications of as}'mmetry for tax competition have
been studird hy, e.g.. Bucovetsky (1991)
i3respect to the two tax instruments, z and r, and the provision of public goods, C,
are as follotvs,
E'sP E., E.,P
[-(~a(I t z-) f a(I f rp- f z-)~~F(lí )-(1 t r)h) - p- 0 (3.4)
c„c~ E„ e„c„
-Uz(1 - zf') f a(1 - ,re, - ze~) - 0 (3.~)
e~. e„
t'~'(G) - a - 0 (3.6)
lu these expressions, e, --(dS~dr)~S is the semi-elasticity of saving ~~-ith re-
spect to the tax wedge. r, accounting for any endogenous change in the interest rate.
The semi-elasticity~ e:, can be expressed as follows.
dr dr
e,-(1-dr)e~.-(1-z)~rp (3.7)
`~~xt. the sa~~iuq-investtnent balance implies tlrat dr~dr ean be found as.
dr E,
dr - Ei.
so ihat r,, can be ~critten as.
e,.e„
e' - c„ -F (1 - ~ )P ~- t;,,
(3.3)
(3-~~)
Oplintality~ conditious (3.!) and (3.:~j take into account that unlike in the small
open economy changes in either the protit tax. :, or the capital income tax. .r, affect
the interest rate r. 'hhc change in ihe interest rate independentl}~ affects econontic
beha~ ior and also ocerall capital income tax revenues.
[~ndcrlying the optimality conditions (3.-4)-(3.6), we can distinguish three optimal
tax re~imes that differ in the extent to which the maximum profit tax rate is binding.
For rather weak preferences for public goods, the optimal profit tax is less than its
marimwn z and the capital income tax wedge, x, is rero. In a borderline case, the
profit tax constraint is just binding. i.e. z-~. whilc the tax wedge, r, rcmains cyual
to rero. ~;ext, the profit tax limitation is strictly binding, and the authorities meet
an~' additional tax rccenue need ~eith a positice capital income tax, r.
Figure l illustrates the possible regimes for optimal profit and capital income
tax policy in the closed economy~.
4 Welfare comparisons across different tax instru-
ment sets
hhis section in~rstigates the welfare consequences of the nature of the available tax
instrument set in a world where many small identical countries fail to coordinate
9their capital income tax policies. ~lore precis-ely, the section compaces national wel-
fares across different noncooperative Nash taxation equi}ibria that differ in the tax
instrunrent set, available to each country. Throughout, a(limited) profit tax instru-
ment is taken to exist, and in most of the analysis the profit tax rate, z, equals
its maximum. i.e. z- z G l. .~lgain, the saving tax, u, and the investment tax,
n, are allowed to be of any size, if they are in the tax instrument set. This mean-
s that there are essentially thrc~e scenarios depending on the availability of saving
and investment taxes: i) both investment and saving taxation exist, ii) only saving
taxation exists, iii) only~ investrnent taxation exists. ~Ve focus on the follow-ing two
direct welíare comparisons: i) a comparison of both saving and investment taxation
against only. investment taxation, and ii) a comparison of both saving and in~.est-
nrent taxation against only saving taxation.a The twin comparisons are carried out
in two subsections below.
The general strateg~. of conrparing welfare in two tax regimes - call them a and 6
- is as follows. `~'c~ start out with a certain strength of preferences for public goods,
as proxied by the marginal cost of public funds in regime n. This ~ICPE corresponds
tu certain rates of saving and investment tax and thereby a certain w.edge betwecn
the gross return to invest ment and the net return to saving. ~Ve then investigate
whether. gi~'en the `[CYF. regime a is preferable to the other regime b. fhe wa}~
our tnodel has been set up implies that welEare in a single eountry w~ill be concace
in the sa~'ing-in~rstcucut tax ~ecdga Flence, if the tax wedge in regime n is rlnsttr
to the teedge under coordittation than is the wedge in regime 6, and the differences
bett~'oen each of the non-cooperati~'e tax tvedges and the coordinated tax wedge are
of the same sign. then regirne a is incieecí preferable to regime b.
Consequcntlc, for reginres n and h we ueed the answers to three questions: i)
going from regimc n to full international tax coordination, do countries increase or
reduce the o~'crall sa~'ing-investment tax w'edge, r- u-~ t;? ii) going from regime b to
full coordination, do countries- increase or reduce the ocerall saving-investment tax
w~edge? aud iii) going from regitne n to regime b, do countries increase or redure the
overall sa~ ing-investment tax wedge? Combining the answers to the three yuestions.
we may or mat' not be able to unambiguoush~ rank national welfares in regirnes o
and b.~~
1b formalize the welfare comparison based on tax tvedges, let us introduce the
following notation: a."`' is the `ash equilibrium tax wedge with both tax instrumcnts
available. while .ru and .r" are the `ash eyuilibrium values of u and t~ with only the
sacin,g and investment taxes available, respectivelv. Pinally, s' is the fully~ coordi-
nated tax wedge in all three situations-t'. Similarly., pu`' r~u p~ and q' denote the
9There is a tradition in the international tax literature o( comparing the pure source and
residence principles of capital income tax, cfr for example Giovannini (1989). This ~could here
correspond to comparing only saving taxation to only investment taxation.
roQuestions i) and ii) in reality toncern the scope for international tax coordination and are also
addressed in our companion paper, Huizinga and ~ielsen (1996).
~rAnd hence equal to the saving (or investment) tax rate in the corresponding closed economy
10(perceived) marginal costs of funds in the four cases. "I'he switch from regime a,
which can be the uv, u, v or ~ regime, to a different regime b leads to a larger tax
wedge, if given .z' the regime switch lowers the (perceived) marginal cost of public
funds,
~6 ~ ~n (4.1)
Equivalently, rb in regime b is to be increased beyond ~a, if the (perceived)
increase in utility resulting from more public goods dominates the (perceived) re-
duction in utility resulting frorn less private consumption. Formally, this is Lhe case
if.tz
dV~d.~ 6 dY'~dr
~-dU~d.r~a ~ ~-dG~d~~a - 1 (4.1')
ahere the superscripts refer to the two tax regimes a and b under comparison, and
the subscripts indicate that the value of the tax wedge in the original tax regime a.
i.e. .ca, is to be inserted into the marginal expressions for the two tax regimes. The
right. hand side of the inequality in (-l.l') contains the ratio between the marginal
utilit~- gain from extra public goods and the marginal utility loss from less private
goods, ass-ociated with a unit increase in the saving-investment tax wedge from .z'.
13~- definition. this ratio must be equal to one for xa to be optimal in regime a.
4.1 Both saving and investment taxation vs. only the latter
~[ovl countries de jure impose a residence-based tax on the capita] income of their
domestic residents. In practice, however, the residential capital income tax is ofteu
easil~' evaded. 1'ax evasion of this kind mav effectivelv eliminate the residence-based
capital incorne tax altogether. as cotnmunication and transportation costs decline.1~3
To asses the welfare consequences of a demise of the residential capital income tax.
we fïrst have to answer three questions: i) how does .xuv compare to r` for different
values of the marginal cost of public funds, rf", in thc investment-tax-only regime.'
ii) how does r" compare to x' for different values of p`'? and finally, (iii) how does
a~~`' compare to s" for different valucs of q"'.
~~'ith noncooperative sacing and investment taxes set optimally, each countrc
is indifferent between generating tax revenues at the margin by the saving or the
investment tax instrumeut. For convenience, any increase in the wedge. r. in any
indi~-idual economy can be thought to come about through a higher sacing tax. u.
[~sing ('l.7) and (3.~), we can then evaluate (.t.l) to find that coordination of saving
r-"1'he ratios in (4.1') may also be written as (V'~Uz)(l~r)), i.e. as the ratio between marginal
utili[ies, at the optimal point in regime a, times the inverse of the relevant marginal cost o( public
funds. "ihis establishes the equivalence to the inequality between the MCPFs in (4.1).
131n fact, heen (1993) and others argue that the combination oflimitations on (oreign tax credits,
deSrrral and evasion of home taxes on portfolio income from abroad pushes the present situation
of capital income taxation towards an effeUive source basis.
11artd in~estcnent taxes ( i.e. going from regime uv to regime .) leads to a higher
sa~~ing-im~estment tax wedge, r, if,
1 - ze,~e~, 1
G (4.'l)
1- re, - re,~e~. 1- 2~e„
~rhere u and r are the values of the saving tax and the tax wedge in the noncooper-
ati~.e sacing-cum-investment tax regirne (for convenience the superscript 'uv' on z,
r. and u has been dropped).
`est. t~~e can use (2. ï) and (2.8) to express the saving tax, u, as a ftmction of
the overall tax wedge. r. in the saving-cum-investment tax regime as Collotvs,
e~-r - (1 - z)a
u - e,. -~ ( 1 - c )( 1 - n)e,~,
(~.:;)
which along ~~.ith (-4.2) implies that coordination leads to a larger saving-incestment
tax wedge. a~, if.
r~ ~ ~-I-~ (}.})
e~ e~
ecl. ({.~) tndicates that a larger sar ing-im'estment tax wedge is warranted. if the
non-couperati~-e tax ~~~edge is alread}. relatively large. To see why, note that a larger
sa~ ing-in~~estment tax r~~Fdge implies a larger required gross return to in~'estment. :`
higlrcrr t~.r wedge, r. therefare loa-ers cíomestic profits accruing to fnreign rrsidents,
Lower second-period profit income for foreigners has a positive incorne effect on
their first-period sa~-ing. and it thus leads to larger foreign saving tax reo.enues for a
gicen sa~ ing tax rate. This represents a positi~-e internatioual externalit~- of natioual
capital incorne tax policc that is overlooked. absent tax coordination. For lo~t ~'alues
of r. eq. ( l..f) instead immediately implies that iuternational tax coordination leads
to an ecen lo~~.er tax ~~-edge, and a reduction in the provision of public goods. In these
instances, the noncooperative saving-im~estment tax wedge is in fact too high, as the
existence oC foreign ownership leads to beggar-th~~-neigl[bor-t~~pe, high in~esUnent
t axes.
.analogously to (d.~t), the coordination of the capital income tax rr~edge rr~hcn
both sa~~ing and investment taxes exist sl[ould lead to a higher tax wedge if tlte
marginal cost of public funds is relati~.el~- large, and vice versa. 'I'o see this, express
the optimal saving and investment tax rates in the [n~ regirne b~~ means of thc
marginal cost of public funds, applying (2.ï) and (2.3). Csing s- u t['. (d.-I) then
becomes equi~-alent to,
~u~~ 1 1 f e~` (.3.5)
P
`ext, we compare the noncooperative tax wedgc in the absence of the saving tax
to the tax wedge under full tax coordination. Evaluating (4.1) for the transition from
an investment-tax-only regime to full coordination, we see that this switch leads to
a larger saving-investment tax wedge if,
(1 - z)a(e„ ~-(1 - z)e~) )
v-~1 (4.6
e~(e„ -~ (f - z)ÍP -f- ne,.)~
1'?From (4.6), we infer that for large values of v the saving-investment tax wedge in
the coordinated equilibrium is even greater than in the investment-tax-only regime.
Underlying (4.6), there are two opposing externalities of national investment tax
policy. First, the investment tax as usual affects foreign welfare negatively to the
extent that the investment tax is borne by the foreign owners of domestic firms.
This spill-over points towards an overly high investment tax in the absence of coor-
dination. Second, a higher investment tax causes a lower international interest rate,
leading to a worldwide rise in investment and thus foreign investment tax revenues.
'I'his second spill-over tends to a noncoordinated investment tax that is too low.
Formula (4.6) indicates that the second externality dominates for relatively high
noncooperative investment tax rates, and vice versa. '
Equivalently to (4.6), going from the investment-tax-only regime to full coordi-
nation leads to an increase in the overall saving-investment tax wedge if the marginal
cost oí funds, rlv, in the first instance exceeds a certain critical level as follows,
a(1 - z)e„
rtu 7 1 f
e~ -f (1 - z)P
(4.7)
In deriving (4.7), (2.8) is used to express the investment tax rate in the v regime
as a function of the marginal cost of public funds in that regime. Substituting into
(4.6) then yields (4.7).
What remains is to compare the size of the saving-investment tax wPrlge in the
noncooperative regimes with co-existing saving and investment taxes and with only
an investment tax. To start, let us consider that preferences for public goods are suf-
ficiently strong that in the investment-tax-only regime the marginal cost of funds, rl~,
exceeds unity so that the investment tax rate exceeds the national income maximiz-
ing value of a(1 - z)~e„ ( cfr. (2.8)). The introduction of the saving tax instrument
then implies that the authorities gain access to an initially non-distortionary tax
instrument. The saving tax thus will be set at a positive rate to finance additional
public goods, while the investment tax rate declines. The marginal cost of public
funds falls (but remains above unity), in the sense that 1 G r~"v G n" for the given
strength of preferences for public goods, and the overall saving-investment tax wedge
rises.
Alternatively, we can consider that preferences for public goods are weak enough
that the marginal cost of funds, rl", in the investment-tax-only regime initially is less
than unity. Then the introduction of the saving tax instrument leads to the provision
of a saving subsidy to domestic residents, a cut-back in public goods provision, a
higher marginal cost of public funds, a higher investment tax and a lower overall
saving-investment tax wedge. In summary, we conclude that,'"
a(1 - z)
x"" ) xv iff rtu ~ 1, i.e. iff x" ~ (4.8)
Cv
19More formally, (4.8) can be demonstrated by applying expreavions for rt" and rt~~, as derived
from (2.8), in (4.1). Elirther, use that in the v regime, v- z and v- Q while in the uv regime, u
and v can be expressed via z, using formula (4.3) and v- r- u.
13The information regarding the relative sizes of thc saving-investment tax wedges
in the saving-cum-investment-tax regime and the investment-tax-only regime (rel-
ative to each other and relative to a regime of full international coordination) is
graphed in Figure 3. The horizontal axis in Figure 3 shows the marginal cost of
public funds for the investment-tax-only regime. A varyíng MCPF proxies for vary-
ing strength of preferences for public goods. The vertical axis depicts the size of the
saving-investment tax wedge in the three regimes, as functions of the preferences
for public goods. The figure contains three curves. First, the .zv-curve depicts the
saving-investment tax wedge in the investment-tax-only regime as related to the
marginal cost of pubGc funds, pv, in this regime. This curve shows that xv becomes
positive, once the marginal cost of public funds, r~", exceeds 1- a and generally
increases with r)v. Second, the x'-curve represents the fully coordinated tax wedge
as related to the marginal cost of funds rw. Reftecting (4.7), we see that x' exceeds
x~ if r~~ exceeds 1 t a(1 - z)e„~[e„ ~(1 - z)p], and vice versa. Third, the xuu-curve
pictures the noncoordinated tax wedge in the saving-cum-investment tax regime a-
gainst the cost of funds rlu. Reflecting (4.8), the latter curve is situated above the
xu-curve for values of r~u exceeding unity, and vice versa. The particular value of rw,
denoted r~', at which the x'-curve crosses the xuv curve from below is also shown in
the figure. It exceeds 1~ a(1 - z)e„~[e„ f(1 - z)p] and corresponds to a value of
pu" of 1~- e„~p, cfr. (4.5).
Now we are in a position to compare national welfares in the noncooperative
saving-cum-investment tax and investment-tax-only regimes. From the figure, we
can see that xuv ) xv 1 x" for values of w in the half-open interval (1, 1 f a(1 -
z)e„~(e„ ~- (1 - z)p)]. Given that welfare is concave in the saving-investment tax
wedge and maximized in the ~ regime, it follows that for preferences for public goods
leading to values of r~v in this interval the investment-tax-only regime dominates the
saving-cum-investrnent tax regime. For completeness, this conclusion is also valid
for values of r~v slightly larger than 1~- a(1 - z)e„~(e„ t(1 - z)p)]'s. In all these
instances, the intended or unintended omission of the saving tax instrument thus is
welfare improving. The results are summarized as follows:
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that countries cannot tax profits completely and that
there is some cross-ownership of firms. Then for intermediate preferences for public
goods, corresponding to intermediate values for the marginal cost of public funds
in the noncooperative investment-tax-only regime (i.e between 1 and some value
slightly above 1~-a(1- z)e„~(e„ f(1- z)p)]), welfare in that regime exceeds welfare
in the noncooperative saving-cum-investment tax regime.
To reiterate, it is the temptation on the part of governments to capture profits
which would otherwise accrue to foreigners that leads to overtaxation of capital
income with access to both capital income tax instruments, providede preferences
for public goods are not too strong. The elimination of the saving tax lessens this
excess taxation, so is warranted in this situation.
tsAs well as for values of rl~ equal to or slightly lazger than the minimum ot 1- o
144.2 Both saviug and investment taxation vs. ouly the former
:~s statecl in Lhe introduction, seceral authors have argued that optitnally~ small open
ecunornies do not levv source-level investment taxes and that thus a residence-based
system of capital incorrte taxation is desirable.ts 5ection `L already demonstrated that
the conclusion that s-ingle countries optimally do not Ievy source-based investment
taxes has to be rnocíified. once incomplete profit taxation is taken into account.
'hhis section considers tvhether a s~~stem of residence-based capital income taxation
only (ancl t.hus an elirnination of thc investment tax) rnay nevertheless impro~~e
tcelfare, gicen that countries fail Lo coordinate their tax policies. l~~e demonstate that
going to only resiclence-based capital income taxation (from a combined resicience-
and source-basecl capital income tax regime) indeed irnproves national ~celfare. if
proferenct~s for public goods are n~roderate enough as to Iead to a marginal cost of
public fruuls (in the residence-taxat ion-only regime) close to one. Generallt', ho~ce~'er.
the c~limination of source-le~~el im'cstment taxation reduces national welfare.
fu start, c~-e hace to compare the saving-im~estrnent tax ~ceclge in the sa~ing
cuin-in~'estment tax rogime and tho sa~ ing-tax-onl~' regime (to each other and to t he~
fiill-coonlinatiou tax ~~'ecl~e). "l'he comparison of sacing-im.estment tax wedgos iu the
noncuopcrative saving-cuin-invest.mcnt tax regime and the full-coordinatiou regirue
lias alroacly' beeu matle in .~ubsc~ction ~. L To proceed, tce compare the noucooperat i~'e
,n~-in~; tav-onlv tax nrdgc~ to the full coordinatiun tax tcedgt'. Et.~luating ( l.l). tce
.oc that goiug from the sa~~ing tax-only- regimc to the full-coordination regime leads
[o a ~arget' sa~'ing-inve~tnteut tax tecdgc if.
1 - -e.,~c~. 1
G ( i.9)
I - ue, - -e,~e„ l - ue„
I~:y. (~l.9) simpl}' reduces tu u~ 0, w-hich implies thal a positi~'e sa~ing tax in
t hr sa~~ing-tax-unl~~ regime is increased under coordination. 'Po see why~. note thal a
highc,r sa~ing tax raises thc international pre-tax interest rate, r, and thus forcign-
cuiuitr}~ sa~~ing and sa~~ing tax reveuues. In the absence of coordinatiuu. this positi~~e
ostc,niality~ of higlicr uational sa~.in~ tas rates is ignorc~d, ~~'hich gi~'es rise to a uon-
coordinated sa~ing tax ratc that is too low. Conversel~~, eq. (.1.9) ~night secrn to
tinrgc~st that a negati~'e ~ash equilibrium sacing tax is reduced evcn further uncler
coorclinat.ion. ~l'his is uot. the case, howe~~er." as under full coorclination there can-
not osist. a negatice sa~-ing-incestment tax wedge. ~Che negative saving ta~ in Lhe
sacin~-tax-onl~- rcgimc is financcd b~~ a maximum profit tax. [nstead, coorclination
lo~cers Ihc profit tax rate to restore a zero saving-investment tax ~~-edge, tvhence in
tlii, instance the cost of funcls is unity (rather than less than unity as in the nonco-
ordinatc,d casc with a sacing subsidy). 1'his also implies a cutback in puhlic goods
pro~ ision. Coordination (starting frotn Lhe saving-tax-only regime) thus ala-ays Icacis
~"~l sirnilar claim is found in ~lintz and Tulkens (1996).
~'"['echnically, application of the critrrion (4.9) presupposes full utilization of the profit tax in
both rcgimrs.
lato an increase in the saving-investment tax wedge, unless the saving tax is zero, in
a.hich case it remains zero.
Finally. we compare the saving-investment tax wedge in the noncooperative
saving-cum-investment tax regime and the noncooperative saving-tax-only regime.
I'he simplest way to approach the question is to apply the saving-tax-only regime as
the st.art.ing point, and then examine the introduction of an investment tax. First,
consider that in the saving-tax-only regime the profit tax is strictly at its max-
imum and the saving tax is negative. The saving tax then exceeds its minimum
value of -a~((1 - a)eu], and the rnarginal cost of public funds, ~u - 1~(1 - ueu),
is less than unity, but greater than the minimum value of (1 - a)eu~(eu - ap).
~Vith a newly available investment tax, the marginal cost of public funds drops to
(1 -a)~[1 ~-(1 -a)up~. triggering a positive investment tax rate. The investment tax
proceeds are in part used to enhance the saving subsidy and in part to increase the
provision of public goods. .a larger supply of public goods implies that the introduc-
tion of the itrvestment tax leads to a larger (less negative) overall saving-investment
tax tcedge.
:~lternaticely. we can consider that the saving tax is positive in the noncoopera-
ti~-e saving-tax-only regime. 1'here then similarly is a scope for a positive investment
tax if rnade available. Specifically, the introduction of the investment tax leads to
a lower sacing tax rate and marginal cost of public funds, and a larger provision of
public goods. ~Vith an initially binding profit tax,18 the introduction ot an mvest-
ment tax into a saving-tax-only regime thus ahvays leads to a larger noncooperative
saving-investment tax wedge.ts
(1 - a)e~ -a
z,u` ~ i" iff q" ~ i.e. iff ru )
eu - ap ' (i - a)eu
The tax wedge comparisons discussed in this subsection are reflected in Figure 4.
.~gain, the strength of preferences for public goods, as proxied by the marginal cost
of public funds r~u in the noncooperative saving-tax-only regime, varies along the
horizontal axis in the figure, while the vertical axis contains the saving-investment
tax wedge in the uv, u ancí ~ regimes. The three curves - labeled xu~. ~" and .r`
- indicate how the saving-investment tax wedges in the corresponding regimes are
related to the 1ICPF in the sacing-tax-only regime. In the figure, the .ru`'-curve al-
wavs lies above the ru-curve with the trivial exception of their common minimum
point. where the profit tax is not fully utilized, and where adding the investment tax
tivould be immateriaL The figure now enables us to compare national welfares un-
der the noncooperative saving-cum-investment and noncooperative saving-tax-only
regimes. In so doing, we again apply that welfare is maximized under coordination,
and that welfare is concave in the saving-investment tax wedge. First, note that if
p" exceeds q" in the figure (here r~" - p" corresponds to r~uv - 1 f e„~p as in (4.5)),
telf the profit tax does not bind, there is no scope for an investment tax.
~sTo demonstrate this more formally, use (2.7) and the fatt that in the u regime, x- u, while
in the ut, regime, u is related to x by (4.3).
16then the saving-cum-iuvestment-tax regime clearly dominates the saving-tax-only
regime. Enforcing a purely residence-based capital income tax system by agreeing
to eliminate source-based in~'estment taxes thus is a bad idea for relatively strong
preferences for public goods. Second, for qu in the vicinity of unity, corresponding to
only rnoderate preCerences for public goods, we see that the saving-tax-only regime
dominates the sa~'ing-cunr-investment tax regime. "hhis is the case where the intro-
duction of an incestrnent tax intrument just leads to an overly high incestment tax
to get at the Coreign owners of domestic firms. In this instance, a move to a residence-
based-onlc tax regime is clearly welfare improving. These results are summarized as
follotcs
PROPOSITIO` 2. Suppose that countries can only tax profits incompletely and
that thcrre is sorne cross-ow~nership of firms. Then for rather moderate preferences
for public goods, corresponding to values for the rnarginal cost of public Cunds around
unity in the sa~ ing-tax-only reginre, this rcgime w'elfare dominates the sa~'ing-cum-
in~'estnlent tax regime.
4.3 No foreigii firm ownership or complete profit taxation
Our anal~5is this Car has been carried out under the twin realistic assumptions
that there are constraints on the extent ot profit taxation, and that there is cross-
ownership of firnrs. For cotnpleteness, we here briefly consider the opposite cases in
which either cornplete proht taxation is possible. or all firms in ecen. countr}' are
owued bc domestic citizens.
If firms are owned exclusively bv domestic residents, there will be no cross-
countn' profit flows. "This etfectiveh' brings us back to the setting in the paper
by E3uco~'etsky and R~ilson (1991). They demonstrate that non-cooperative capital
income tax policv w.ith hoth sa~~ing and incestrnent taxes corresponds completel~
to the coorcíinated policy stance (and to tax policy in the paralfel closecí economy).
Hence. there is no scope for policy coordination, and losing either the sa~~ing tax or
the imrstment tax is bound to be detrirnental to welCare.
If profit taxes can he levied w.ithout limit, the investment tax which basically
functious as a second best tax on profits disappears frorn the optimal tax package
in the noncooperative tax equilibria with acceas to both saving and in~'estment
taxes. Obviously, losing the in~~estment tax will then be immaterial. so that welfare
le~'els in the saving-and-in~'estrnent-tax and sa~'ing-tax-only regimes are thc same.
If furthermore the profit tax is fully utilized (at one ftundred percent), these two
regirnes both correspond to coordinated tax policy.
However, i[ there is cross-ownership of firms, and if non-cooperative tax policy
implies less than full use of the unbounded profit tax, welfare will improve if countries
no longer have access to the saving tax. [n the situation in which the profit tax is
not usecí in full it partly finances a saving subsidy to domestic citizens as a second
best means oC transfering income from foreign owners of domestic firms to national
lïresielents. Since coordination of tax policies would elirninate such a negative saviug
tax, mo~ing from the sa~'ing-and-irn'estment-tax regime to the in~.estment-tax-only
rcgitue a'ould clearl~' be beneficial in such a situation. 'Phus, despite the assumed
acailability- of cornplete profit taxation ~ce hace identified y~et another instance in
rchich the loss of a capital income tax instrument ~cill be ~~.elfare impro~'ing.
5 Conclusions
l~hi~ paper has compared national ~~'elfare across ~-arious noncooperati~'e capital
income tax regimes. ~hhe international tax regime for the case where there are sacing.
in~~estment and profit taxation is generally inefficient r~~hen there is incomplete profit
taxat ion and some foreign o~anership of dontestic firrns. entailing cross-country~ profit
flo~c~s. The paper shocc~s that in this sccond-best world the elimination of either the
sacing tax or the iucestnrent tax may improve national ~celfare in all countries.
1t present. rnost countries de jure Ie~'y' both residence-based saring taxes and
source-based in~'estnrent and profit taxes. Residence-based capital income taxes.
ho~cee.er. are increasingl~' rlifficult to enforce. as international capital markets berorne
n;orc~ integrated. I'he~ crasion of residential capital income taxes could ultimatel}'
Iead to t ht? effecti~'e eliminatinn nf the Laxation of sa~ing. Proposition 1 of the paper
indicates that such an elimination paradoxically. may impro~'e ~celfare, as it ma~
brin; thr sa~ing-im'estment capital income tax ~~~edge closer to the tax ~cedge that
is optimal nnder coordination. Ihis ~cill occur if preferences for public goods arc
not too st rong. :~t the other estreme. a s~c'itch to exclusi~.elc residence-based capital
income taxes (and thus the elimiuation of source-based investment lases). as has
been recomnrended by many scholars. rnac also improve o~'erall ~celfare. gi~'en the
current absence of iuternational tax coordination. :1s established in Proposition ?.
thi, ~cill only~ happen if preterences for public goods are rather u-ealc.
1'sing the techniques in this paper. a direct comparison of a combination of
sacíng and profit taxes ancí a combination of inrestntent and profit taxe, can also
be unclertal:en. ~~'ith both incomplete profit taxation and cross-o~cnership of firms.
the comparison becomes somewhat in~'ol~'ed. F.ither tax regime can in principle
dominate in r~~elfare terms. .~s a general tendenc}'. horce~'er. the sa~~ing tas rcgime
is ruore likely to he preferred, the largcr is thc in~-estment semi-elasticity- rclati~'e to
the sa~'ing semi-elasticit~', and cice cersa.
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